A) The Angra 3 Nuclear Power Project

Nuclear energy provides about 3% of Brazil’s electricity. In 2007, gross production was 445 billion kWh, with net imports of 39 billion kWh being required. Of the total generated in the country, 84% of power was from hydro, 3.5% from gas, 4% from biomass, just over 5% from coal and oil, and 3% (12.4 million kWh) from nuclear. In 2009, nuclear power generated 13 billion kWh of electricity. Per capita electricity consumption in Brazil has grown strongly since 1990 – from under 1500 kWh/yr in 1990 to nearly 2200 kWh/yr in 2007.

The high dependence on hydro gives rise to some climatic vulnerability which is driving policy to diminish dependence on it. Despite this, in February 2010 the government approved $9.3 billion investment in the new 11.2 GWe Belo Monte hydro scheme, which will flood 500 sq km of the Amazon basin and supply about 11% of the country’s electricity. About 40% of Brazil’s electricity is produced by the national Eletrobrás Systema. About 20% of electricity is from state-owned utilities, and the rest is from privately-owned companies.

Angra 1 suffered continuing problems with its steam supply system and was shut down for some time during its first few years. Its lifetime load factor over the first 15 years was only 25%, but since 1999 it has been much better. Civil works on Angra 2 started in 1976 and, due to a lack of financial resources and a lower than expected growth in demand, only commenced operation at the end of 2000. Angra 3 was designed to be a twin of unit 2, with a 1,400MW generating capacity. Work started on the project in 1984 but was suspended in 1986 before full construction began. Around 70% of the equipment is on site, full construction did not begin and work on the project was suspended in 1986.

In November 2006 the government announced plans to complete Angra 3 and also build four further 1000 MWe nuclear plants from 2015 at a single site. Angra 3 construction approval was confirmed by Brazil’s National Energy Policy Council in June 2007 and received Presidential approval in July. Environmental approval was granted in March and all other approvals by July 2009. In December 2008, Eletrobrás Termonuclear S/A (Eletronuclear) signed an industrial cooperation agreement with Areva, confirming that Areva will complete Angra 3 and be considered for supplying further reactors. Areva also signed a services contract for Angra 1. First concrete for Angra 3 was due in 2009. A construction licence was granted by the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) at the end of May 2010, and construction resumed two days later, in June. The plant is expected in operation at the end of 2015 after 66 months.

B) Financial challenges

Economically, power from existing nuclear plants is about 1.5 times more expensive than that from established hydro, and power from Angra 3 is expected to be slightly over twice as expensive as old hydro, about the same as that from coal and cheaper than that from gas. Overall, including Angra 3 in projections reduces network prices slightly. Plans to build two new nuclear plants in the northeast and two more near Angra in the southeast are underway1. At the end of 2009, Eletronuclear commenced initial siting studies at four potential locations in the northeast2, and is aiming to present a list of 40 possible sites to the Mines & Energy Ministry by mid-2011. Eletronuclear is looking at the Westinghouse AP1000 (which is reported to be favoured), the Areva-Mitsubishi Atmea-1 and Atomstroyexport’s VVER-1000.

In December 2010, The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) approved BRL 6.1 billion (US$ 3.6 billion) in financing for Angra 3, covering almost 60% of the BRL 9.9 billion estimated cost. This month Eletronuclear received an offer for a EUR1.5bn (US$2.02bn) loan from a pool of five French banks led by Société Générale to develop its Angra III nuclear power plant in Rio de Janeiro state. This is only one of many recent developments in the country’s nuclear sector. Sustained by strong economic and demographic growth, Brazil’s power demand is indeed expected to increase significantly in the coming years and the country is planning to boost nuclear generation along with its more developed hydro generation. Brazil’s Senate still has to approve the loan, and a decision on the matter is not expected until the second half of 2011. Construction of Angra 3is currently underway and the new nuclear power plant is expected to start production by 2015. The total investment for the project has been estimated at BRL9.9bn (US$5.91bn).

C) About Eletronuclear and BNDES

Eletronuclear was established in 1997 for the purpose of operating and building thermal nuclear power plants in Brazil. A subsidiary of Eletrobrás, Eletronuclear is a government-controlled company that accounts for the generation of approximately 3% of electric power consumed in Brazil. By the interconnected electric power system, such power reaches the main consumer centers in Brazil and corresponds, for example, to more than 50% of electric power consumption in the State of Rio de Janeiro, a proportion to be considerably expanded on completion of the third unit of Admiral Álvaro Alberto Nuclear Power Station (CNAAA). At present, nuclear power plants Angra 1 – with a generating capacity of 657  electric megawatts, and Angra 2 – rated at 1350 electric megawatts are in operation. Angra 3, to practically be a replica of Angra 2, (incorporating the technological advances made since the construction of the latter) is also planned

BNDES is the main financing agent for development in Brazil. Since its foundation, in 1952, the BNDES has played a fundamental role in stimulating the expansion of industry and infrastructure in the country. Over the course of the Bank’s history, its operations have evolved in accordance with the Brazilian socio-economic challenges, and now they include support for exports, technological innovation, sustainable socio-environmental development and the modernization of public administration. The Bank offers several financial support mechanisms to Brazilian companies of all sizes as well as public administration entities, enabling investments in all economic sectors. In any supported undertaking, from the analysis phase up to the monitoring, the BNDES emphasizes three factors it considers strategic: innovation, local development and socio-environmental development. The BNDES’ disbursements reached R$ 168.4 billion in 2010, a 23% increase when compared to the previous year. The result takes into consideration Petrobras’ R$ 24.7 billion capitalization operation. When this operation – a one-off and non-recurring – is not considered, the Bank’s disbursements ended 2010 at R$ 143.7 billion, a 5% increase when compared to 2009, growth which is compatible with previously made projections. Industry accounted for 47% of the Bank’s total disbursements, followed by Infrastructure, with 31% presence, and by Trade and Services, at 16%. In all areas of activity (agriculture, industry, infrastructure, trade and services) disbursements grew in 2010, resulting mostly from the successful Investment Maintenance Program (PSI). Launched in July 2009 and expected to last until next March 31, 2011, PSI guaranteed the return of investment to the country amidst the global financial and economic crisis.

As the ninth largest economy in the world – expected to reach fifth place in the next decade – and the largest of Latin America, Brazil is today one of the best markets for foreign investment and an increasingly important operator in the international geopolitical stage. Despite that, three recent reports have described the quality of Brazil’s transport infrastructure – including the airport system – as ranking among some of the worst in the world, despite growing demand from international manufacturers for goods produced in the country.

a) The first report, by the Brazilian economic consultancy LCA Consultores – which analyzed results from a competitiveness poll conducted among attendees at the 2009/2010 World Economic Forum in Geneva – indicates that compared to another 20 countries with which it competes on a global scale, Brazil hangs on to the 17th slot in infrastructure quality in general. On a 1-7 rating scale, Brazil scored 3.4, below the world average of 4.1.

b) The second report, by Brazil’s Applied Economics Research Institute (IPEA), indicates that a number of airports are on the edge of an operational collapse, meaning there is a considerable threat of a logistics blackout in the airport sector unless investment is initiated immediately. The IPEA report said demand for air travel is expected to triple in the next 20 years, especially with the World Cup and 2016 Olympics putting additional pressure on the country’s transport infrastructure, making the situation all the more pressing.

c) The third report, by consultancy company McKinsey, indicates that investment of BRL25-34bn (US$15-20bn) is needed to meet growing demand in the airport sector over the next 20 years. The study found that Brazil’s 20 main airports need massive investments in upgrades to enable them cater for the growing passenger traffic demand up to 2030. The study further concludes that airports such as the Viracopos international airport in Sao Paolo may need up to BRL4-6bn (US$2-3bn) reals to enhance its capacity to handle passenger traffic in its metropolitan area, the most congested in the country. On the other hand, the state’s Congonhas airport was said to be in dire condition, with capacity levels already exceeded, revealed the study. Only tow Brazilian airports were found to be in better condition, the Galeão airport in Rio de Janeiro, and the Curitiba airport in Paraná state.

With these findings in mind, President Dilma Rouseef wants to make a firm position that the country’s airport system will indeed improve in a fast track model. In her 3rd day in Office the new President has decided to privatize the construction and operation of 2 new airport terminals in the State of São Paulo. President Dilma also decided to open up the capital of INFRAERO (the Brazilian Airport Infrastructure Company) and create an special Secretariat – directly attached to the the Presidency’s Office – to oversight civil aviation business in Brazil.

President’s Office has already started meeting with companies interested in the construction and operation of the 2 new terminals in the State of São Paulo. Those companies have been informed that concession agreements for the new terminals will be of at least 20 years and will have BNDES’ (the Brazilian Development Bank) participation in the financing. The BNDES Credit Lines comprise long-term financing, at competitive interest rates, for the development of investment projects, the commercialization of machinery and equipment, and the growth of Brazilian exports. Credit lines and programs provided by the BNDES serve the investment needs of companies of any size and sector set up in Brazil.

Other investments recently announced shall be placed in the airports at Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Cuiabá, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Manaus, Natal, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, the other 11 host cities of the 2014 World Cup. The Government expectation is that all work shall be completed between June 2013 and April 2014, so that the airports shall be ready to welcome the large number of tourists that should visit the country in this period.

Auction date has been defined

The meeting held between Dilma Roussef, the Brazilian President-elect and members of the State Office and the Government transport sector sealed the date for the auction for the bullet train that will connect Campinas-São Paulo-Rio de Janeiro. According to Dilma’s decision, it will take place on November 29, 2010.

Requests had been made by businessmen to postpone this date, and in view of this, the meeting was held yesterday been the President-elect and the members of the government responsible for the auction.

According to allegations of interested parties, the administration had delayed in disclosing the rules due to the electoral process, which allegedly had impaired companies from taking this decision and from concluding feasibility studies on the project.

Notwithstanding these complaints, the decision was made to maintain the date set on the invitation to bid. Bids will be delivered by the November 29 and the winner will be disclosed 18 days afterwards.

The works, which are now estimated to cost US$ 20 billion awakened the interest of South Korea, China, Japan, Germany, France and Spain.

Funding

The Government published a provisional measure to guarantee funding of up to US$ 12 billion for Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social – BNDES financing for the project.

Provisional Measure 511 included a clause that permits the Federal Government cover up to US$ 3 billion should income for the project fall below what has been forecast for the first 10 years of operation.  This measure seeks to guarantee the interests of foreign investors in the project.

BNDES has held discussions with Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Spanish, German and French investors. The cap for the tariff has been set at US$ 115 for the segment between Rio and São Paulo.  The trip will take one hour and thirty minutes (1:30) and the extension of the bullet train is 511 km.

After finishing the project 467 days late, Maropakis had sent letters asking for a time extension but failed to turn them into a formal, certified claim. Maropakis then brought a claim against the Navy for the unpaid contract balance, which the Navy had withheld as partial payment for claimed LDs. The Navy counterclaimed for the full 467 days of LDs. The court granted summary judgment on the Navy’s counterclaim, on the basis that since Maropakis had never formally sought (in the form of a certified claim) a time extension, the court had no jurisdiction to consider such a claim in defense of the LD assessment. The trial court agreed, as did the Federal Circuit on appeal.

The Federal Circuit’s ruling on appeal was as follows: “we hold that a contractor . . . must meet the jurisdictional requirements and procedural prerequisites of the CDA [Contract Disputes Act-the U.S. law that requires claims to be certified before they can be litigated], whether asserting the claim against the government as an affirmative claim or as a defense to a government action.” The Court saw no reason to distinguish between affirmative claims and matters of defense to government claims in applying the requirement for a certified claim prior to litigation, at least when the defense would involve an adjustment to the contract terms, as in the case of a time extension.

The dissenting opinion argued in vain that there is a clear distinction between presenting an affirmative claim for relief, where claim certification is required, and simply defending against a government claim, where no affirmative relief is sought.

The simple lesson of Maropakis is that whenever completing a U.S. government contract late, it is vital to submit a formal claim for a time extension so as to preserve your right to dispute a possible LD assessment (which may not come for several years). There are also two broader concerns. First, this is another brick in the wall of recent decisions by the Federal Circuit hostile to the position of Contractors. Contractors should be learning that they are not dealing with a tribunal at all inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt. Second, developments in the law relating to U.S. government contracts frequently spread to the U.S. private sector. Where private contracts require some sort of formalities associated with asserting a claim, the Owner may raise similar arguments, seeking to bar any ability to dispute its later assessment of LDs when the claim formalities were not followed to seek a time extension.

Andrew Ness
Christian Henel

With the loss of capability of investment by the public sector, there was a global tendency in 80’s and 90’s to diminish the role of the State, with the privatization and concession of public services to the private sector. In Brazil, The Brazilian Privatization Program – PND, was instituted under the Law No. 8,031, of 04/12/1990, when the concept of privatization became an integral part of the economic reforms initiated by the Federal Government. At that time, all effort was concentrated on the sale of productive state owned companies, tied to strategic sectors, which allowed the inclusion of steel manufacturers, petrochemical and fertilizer companies in the PND.

Between 1990 and 1994, the Federal Government privatized 33 companies, 18 of which were controlled companies and 15 minority shareholder participations of Petroquisa and Petrofertil. Other eight auctions of minority shareholdings were held under Decree No. 1,068. Through these operations the Government obtained receipts of US$ 8.6 billion that, along with the US$ 3.3 billion in debt transferred to the private sector, brought the total to US$ 11.9 billion.

Due to the large amount of funds needed for the viability of infrastructure projects, private companies were incapable of compromising their budgets during the long course of maturation of such projects. The transfer of part of the infrastructure to private initiative, demanding substantial investments in its planning, development and operation, began to be financed by other agents and other sources, due to the integration of the partners in the respective projects.

Commercial banks, multilateral agencies, export credit institutions, pension funds, insurance companies and participants in international capital markets became important financiers of infrastructure projects in Brazil through Project Finance. As a financial model which adapts itself to the need of funds for projects developed by the private sector, Project Finance represents an important instrument to make investments in infrastructure viable in developing countries viable.

The Practical Use and Importance of Project Finance

Project Finance is usually defined as the financing of long-term infrastructure, industrial projects and public services based upon a non-recourse or limited recourse financial structure where project debt and equity used to finance the project are paid back from the cash flow generated by the project. In this context, it represents a financing technique which generally allows a company to raise funds to set up a project based on the feasibility of such a project and its ability to generate revenues at a level sufficient to cover construction and operational costs, as well as debt service and a return for the investor (cf. FINNERTY, John D. Project Financing: Asset-Based Financial Engineering. London: John Wiley and Sons, 2007, p. 4).

Projects like power plants, toll roads or airports share a number of characteristics that make their financing particularly challenging. Large-scale projects might be too big for any single company to finance on its own. On the other hand, widely fragmented equity or debt financing in the capital markets would help to diversify risks among a larger investors’ base, but might make it difficult to control managerial discretion in the allocation of free cash flows, avoiding wasteful expenditures. Project Finance is than used to strike a balance between the need for sharing the risk of sizeable investments among multiple investors and, at the same time, the importance of effectively monitoring managerial actions and ensuring a coordinated effort by all project-related parties.

Project Finance transactions require joint efforts from lenders, investors, suppliers, off takers and sponsors of the project in order to make feasible the implementation of a project, dealing with special challenges, such as:

(1) They require large indivisible investments in a single-purpose asset: Project Finance than deals have contemplated the creation of a special purpose vehicle with bankruptcy remoteness features, as a ring fencing technique, which usually results in credit enhancement for financiers and cost reductions for sponsors, although the creation of a project company is not necessarily a rule inherent to project finance;

(2) Projects usually undergo two main phases (construction and operation) characterised by quite different risks and cash flow patterns: Construction primarily involves technological and environmental risks, whereas operation is exposed to market risk (fluctuations in the prices of inputs or outputs) and political risk, among other factors. Most of the capital expenditures are concentrated in the initial construction phase, with revenues instead starting to accrue only after the project has begun operation; and

(3) The success of large projects depends on the joint effort of several related parties so that coordination failures, conflicts of interest and free-riding of any project participant can have significant costs: From the construction company to the input supplier, from the host government to the off-taker, all parties have substantial discretion in allocating the usually large free cash flows generated by the project operation, which can potentially lead to opportunistic behaviour and inefficient investments.

Trends of Project Finance Structures in Brazil

A. Detailed Financial Structure

In project finance, several long-term contracts such as construction, supply, off-take and concession agreements, along with a variety of joint-ownership structures, are used to align incentives and deter opportunistic behaviour by any party involved in the project. The definition of the advantages and limits of a Project Finance structure requires a detailed analysis of the various aspects must be made by those interested, involving, amongst others:

(1) A study of the structure that comprises Project Finance, detailing the advantages, the disadvantages and limits of each model;

(2) The criteria of evaluation and requirements established by the agents in charge of classification of credit and the respective impact on the composition of the interest rate of the financing;

(3) Identification, allocation and development and implementation of the criteria and methods to manage the risks involved;

(4) Formulation of an accurate economic-finance model to obtain the resources on the international market;

(5) Techniques and implications of the necessary due diligence; and

(6) Monitoring the project during its building and operational phases and respective management of financial documents, also contemplating the securitization of the receivables.

In Project Finance equity is held by a small number of sponsors and debt is usually provided by a syndicate of a limited number of banks. Concentrated debt and equity ownership enhances project monitoring by capital providers and makes it easier to enforce project specific governance rules for the purpose of avoiding conflicts of interest or suboptimal investments. The use of non-recourse debt in project finance further contributes to limiting managerial discretion by tying project revenues to large debt repayments, which reduces the amount of free cash flows. Moreover, non-recourse debt and separate incorporation of the project company make it possible to achieve much higher leverage ratios than sponsors could otherwise sustain on their own balance sheets.

Nonrecourse debt can generally be deconsolidated, and therefore does not increase the sponsors’ on-balance sheet leverage or cost of funding. From the perspective of the sponsors, non-recourse debt can also reduce the potential for risk contamination. In fact, even if the project were to fail, this would not jeopardise the financial integrity of the sponsors’ core businesses. One drawback of non-recourse debt, however, is that it exposes lenders to project-specific risks that are difficult to diversify. In order to cope with the asset specificity of credit risk in project finance, lenders are making increasing use of innovative risk-sharing structures, alternative sources of credit protection and new capital market instruments to broaden the investors’ base.

Hybrid structures between project and corporate finance are being developed, where lenders do not have recourse to the sponsors, but the idiosyncratic risks specific to individual projects are diversified away by financing a portfolio of assets as opposed to single ventures. Public-private partnerships are becoming more and more common as hybrid structures, with private financiers taking on construction and operating risks while host governments cover market risks.

There is also increasing interest in various forms of credit protection. These include explicit or implicit political risk guarantees, credit derivatives and new insurance products against macroeconomic risks such as currency devaluations. Likewise, the use of real options in project finance has been growing across various industries. Examples include: refineries changing the mix of outputs among heating oil, diesel, unleaded gasoline and petrochemicals depending on their individual sale prices; real estate developers focusing on multipurpose buildings that can be easily reconfigured to benefit from changes in real estate prices.

Finally, in order to share the risk of project financing among a larger pool of participants, banks have recently started to securitize project loans, thereby creating a new asset class for institutional investors. Collateralised debt obligations as well as open-ended funds have been launched to attract higher liquidity to project finance.

B. Partnering Construction Contractual Structure

Within time and the more use of Project Finance structures, parties have evolved to the use of Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) – the favourite contract model for the lenders – and Engineering Procurement Construction Management (EPCM). Nevertheless, because the EPC contract approach shifts all the risk of project completion cost and performance onto the contractor’s shoulders, it tends to trigger an adversarial project team relationship, potentially leading to a breeding ground for conflict, contractual disputes and major claims that undermine the project’s financials and its ultimate successful outcome. Therefore, the challenge in Project Finance has been the adoption of the Alliance contracting as a viable, proven alternative to adversarial business-as-usual contracts.

Alliance contracting offers a unique system of project delivery whereby risks are shared between owner and contractor. They are incentive-based relationship contracts in which the parties agree to work together as one integrated team in a relationship that is based on the principles of equity trust, respect, openness, no dispute and no blame. Alliance contracting can relieve the pressure of the short-term demands on the industry and set the foundation for longer term structural improvement in the way the industry works. Also, significantly reduces, the risk of claims and disputation between the parties through the use of inclusive and collaborative legal and commercial arrangements. These arrangements enable the parties to work together in an open and generative manner and to strive to achieve the business goals of everyone in the relationship and can provide a bankable project delivery method even for project financing.

C. Submission to the Equator Principles

Project Finance transactions may encounter social and environmental issues that are both complex and challenging, particularly with respect to projects in the emerging markets. Large industrial and infrastructure projects, such as for power generation, are becoming increasingly conditioned to social and environmental risk assessments in order to be approved. In this context, Brazil is following the international trend to adopt the Equator Principles for Project Finance transactions.

Equator Principles represent a set of socioenvironmental guidelines adopted by 61 banks worldwide for financing projects amounting to US$10 million or more and are intended to serve as a common baseline and framework for the implementation by each lender of its own internal social and environmental policies, procedures and standards related to its project financing activities.

Today, 7 banks are signatories of the Equator Principles in Brazil. They work to ensure that the projects they finance are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management practices. By doing so, negative impact on project-affected eco-systems and communities should be avoided where possible, and if this impact is unavoidable, it should be reduced, mitigated or compensated for, or both, appropriately.

Conclusion

The success in the financing of an infrastructure project, by means of Project Finance, depends on all the parties involved satisfactorily complying with their various contractual obligations under the Project Finance Documentation. Lenders, as well as the other participants, in accordance with the level of risk being assumed and in proportion to the benefits received from the implementation of the project, will undertake the due diligence needed to adequately measure the risks involved.

The viability of the Project Finance model, in short, is based on the consistency and efficiency of its network of agreements. Such documents must be structured and negotiated in a consistent manner with the respective legislation applicable in the jurisdictions involved, and be constructed in such a way as to allow full implementation of their respective terms and conditions, notwithstanding the natural complexity of the same, in a form which will satisfactorily identify, mitigate, allocate and allow the adequate management of the various risks involved in the Project Finance.

On July 13th 2010 Brazilian Federal Government launched bidding documents regarding the concession regime and procedures for implementation and operation of the High-Speed Rail (TAV – Trem de Alta Velocidade) that will connect the cities of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Campinas. The project, the most ambitious infrastructure project under the country’s Program to Accelerate Growth (PAC – Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento), specifies that the construction, operation, and maintenance will be granted to the consortium that provides the lowest fare for service.

The concession contract establishes the limit of six years to complete the entire stretch Campinas – São Paulo Rio de Janeiro. The final schedule calls for the railway to be completed by 2017, although the Brazilian Federal Government anticipates the line will be partially open before the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.

TAV is worth US 20 billion. The Brazilian Federal Government will invest, through a new state-run entity, US$ 1.5 billion in the project and extend loans worth 60% of the total cost by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES – Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social).

Potential customers in the parcels market can be classified into two main groups:

- existing logistics companies, interested in moving consolidated loads, using rail as part of the chain – principal players in this field are the Brazilian National Post Office (Correios – Empresa Brasileira de Correios e Telégrafos) and Courier Companies; and

- end users, such as businesses, or individuals.

The construction of TAV will create a very large site, which will directly require numerous professional skills and directly or indirectly generate employment upline and downline The commissioning of the railway and, in particular, the development of land traffic and associated commercial zones served by the railway will create jobs in a progressive manner during the first 10 years’ of operation.

It is estimated that the railway will generate around 30,000 jobs throughout the area affected within about 10 years after commissioning. In addition a further 30,000 jobs could be generated by around 2050 in response to more fundamental shifts in the regional economy.

The choice of consortia contractor by the end of 2010

The Brazilian Federal Government will pick the contractor for the TAV in December 2010. Competitors must submit their proposals before November 29 and the winner will be announced on December 16 at the headquarters of Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA – Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo). Term of the concession is 40 years.

The line will be built and run on a concession basis and the government will rank bids based on the lowest fare, with a maximum permitted price of US$ 0.28 per kilometre. That would translate into economy class ticket fares up to US$ 115.00 for the 430 kilometres (270 miles) stretch between Rio and Sao Paulo.

International interest

The bidding is open to both Brazilian and foreign firms. News report that several countries and international companies have expressed interest in participating of the project:

- Austria;

- China (China Railway Materials);

- France (Alstom);

- Germany (Siemens);

- Italy (Ansaldobreda);

- Japan (Hitachi, Kawasaki, Mitsui & Co, Mitsubishi and Toshiba);

- Spain;

- South Korea (Hyundai and Samsung); and

- United Kingdom.

A new company called ETAV

Federal Government also proposed the creation of the Company of High Speed Rail (ETAV – Empresa de Transporte Ferroviário de Alta Velocidade), With the objective of planning and promoting the development of other high-speed rail lines in the country.

ETAV will be linked to the National Agency of Terrestrial Transports (ANTT – Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres) and will be also responsible for managing the technology used by the contractor that wins the High Speed Rail bidding process, in addition to monitoring the project’s deadlines.

Speed, locations and planned route

TAV proposal calls for trains to run at speeds of up to 350 kph (217 mph) and the trip between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro is expected to last 93 minutes. Seven mandatory stations are be built on the line:

- City of Rio de Janeiro downtown area;

- Rio de Janeiro International Airport;

- City of Aparecida, State of São Paulo;

- São Paulo/Guarulhos International Airport;

- City of São Paulo downtown area;

- Campinas/Viracopos International Airport; and

- City of Campinas downtown area.

The planned route will include 90.9 km tunnels and 103 km bridges and viaducts. An extension to Campinas, 70 kilometres from Sao Paulo was planned with the purpose of reaching the heartland of Brazil’s richest manufacturing and farming state.

The planned route is as follows:

The Rent-A-Center decision is complex, and well illustrates the very fine distinctions being made in the U.S. law of arbitration, but which have the net effect of strengthening the arbitrators’ role at the expense of the courts. The underlying broader issue is whether it is for the arbitrators or the courts to decide questions going to whether there is in fact a valid contract and a valid agreement to arbitrate (so called “arbitrability” or “gateway” questions). Under the longstanding Prima Paint rule, a challenge to the validity of the entire contract (including, but not specifically directed at, the arbitration clause) is to be decided by the arbitrators. But a challenge specifically to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, or as to whether that arbitration agreement covers a particular dispute, is normally for the courts to determine. This, however, can be altered by the parties if they “clearly and unmistakably” demonstrate their intent to delegate such gateway questions to the arbitrators.

In Rent-A-Center, a former employee (Jackson) sued his former employer (Rent-A-Center) for employment discrimination. Rent-A-Center sought dismissal in favor of arbitration, based on an arbitration agreement signed by Jackson at the outset of his employment. That agreement (which covered only arbitration; other employment terms were in other documents) not only specifically provided that discrimination claims were to be arbitrated, but contained a separate “delegation” sentence giving the arbitrator “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the . . . enforceability . . . of this Agreement.” Jackson countered by asserting that the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable and thus unenforceable.

The Supreme Court resolved the dispute in favor of arbitration by, in effect, extending the Prima Paint rule. It held, by a 5-4 margin, that since Jackson’s challenge to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement went to the entire arbitration agreement, and not specifically to the “delegation” sentence, then it was up to the arbitrator to determine the unconscionability challenge to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. It was not a matter for the court to decide. This extension of the Prima Paint concept thus appears to further narrow the situations where the court gets to determine “gateway” issues, at least if the arbitration agreement is worded so as to delegate gateway issues to the arbitrators.

The lesson for construction practitioners is thus that the particular wording of the arbitration clause, and how, if at all, it delegates the arbitrators to determine arbitrability issues, is more important than ever. The specific wording, if deemed “clear and unmistakable,” may indeed immunize the parties from any scrutiny by the court of all but the narrowest and specific of challenges to the clause’s enforceability.

Andrew D. Ness

According to a survey recently disclosed by the Ipea – Institute of Applied Economic Research (www.ipea.gov.br), while private capital injections have grown steadily during this period, State investments have faltered. In 1999, public initiative counted only R$ 20.9 million in railways while private initiative channeled R$ 232.8 million. Public initiative’s peak occurred in 2007 with R$ 352 million when, at the same year, private initiative have soared and exceeded R$ 1 billion in 2004. In 2008 private initiative came to R$ 4.3 billion (led in Brazil by mining company Vale, steel company CSN, and logistics company ALL) and State’s investments downsized to R$ 237 million.

As public investments have not changed significantly during the last decade, railway works and network expansion have primarily counted on the funds raised by private concessionaires. The overwhelming presence of highway transportation has caused the railway system to account for only 30% of total transports in volume terms in 2008, as compared to more than 50% in other countries. This is one of the Brazilian infrastructure bottlenecks that impair long-term investments, since it is difficult to make country’s agricultural output flow smoothly.

The Brazilian railway network comprises 12 railways for cargo transportation stretching along circa 28 thousand km. Between 1999 and 2008, the cargo volume carried soared 79.6%, with emphasis on iron ore, pit coal, soybean, corn, sugar, and others. These products are primarily carried through the Vitória-Minas and Carajás railways, and by MRS Logística (controlled by Vale and CSN). For the sake of comparison, thanks to hefty public investments, China can already count on a railway network that stretches along 86 thousand km, and is planning to expand it to 125 thousand km in the next few years.

Ipea estimates that 141 new infrastructure railroad projects would be required to improve efficiency and competitiveness in this industry. Such priority works comprise, among others, the Transnordestina network linking the Brazilian ports of Pecém (CE) and Suape (PE); the North-South railway extension up to the Brazilian port of Rio Grande (RS); and the additional route along this same network to the interior region of São Paulo. Current Brazilian network could be expanded to at least 40 thousand km by 2020. At least R$ 40 billion (around US$ 22 billion) would have to be invested in these projects in the next 10 years.

Basic notes on some of the major projects to come:

1) North-South Railway (EF 151)

1st Parcel – 50% of the winning Auction bid, at the time of financial settlement, upon the signature of the Sub concession Contract and the delivery of the railroad section defined as: Palmas (TO) – Anápolis (GO), scheduled for December 2010.

2nd Parcel – 25% of the winning Auction bid, upon the delivery of the railroad section defined as: the Ouro Verde de Goias (GO) – Rio Verde (GO), scheduled for July 2011.

3rd installment – 25% of the winning Auction bid, upon the delivery of the railroad section defined as: Rio Verde (GO) – Estrela D’Oeste (SP), scheduled for December 2011.

2) West-East Integration Railway (EF 334)

1st Parcel – 40% of the winning Auction bid of financial settlement, upon the signature of the Sub concession Contract and the delivery of the railroad section defined as: Ilhéus (BA) – Caetité (BA), scheduled for July of 2012.

2nd Parcel – 30% of the winning Auction bid, upon the delivery of the railroad section defined as: Caetité (BA) – Correntina / Barriers (BA), scheduled for December 2012.

3rd Parcel – 30% of the winning Auction bid, upon the delivery of the railroad section defined as: Figueirópolis (TO) – Correntina / Barreiras (BA), scheduled for July 2013

Procurement conditions for participation in the railroad projects:

• Acquisition of the Bidding Documents (www.valec.gov.br)
• The participation of individual Brazilian and Foreign Companies is permitted
• The participation of consortiums between Brazilian and / or Foreign Companies in one Consortium is also permitted
• The presentation of a commitment to form a consortium indicating the participation of each member of the consortium and the leader
• The members of the Consortium will reply jointly and individually for all the actions taken with joint responsibility
• The Consortium can not alter its composition without the prior consent of VALEC (VALEC – Engenharia, Construções e Ferrovias S.A., a public company supervised by the ANTT – National Transport Agency and which has the concession for the North South Railway and the West-East Integration Railway)
• Competence in Public Administration
• Unconditional Acceptance of the Conditions in the Procurement Documents

Under current Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all communications between legal counsel and a testifying expert who has been specifically retained to provide expert testimony, as well as drafts of that expert’s report, are subject to discovery by the opposing party. It is routine, not surprisingly, for the opposing party to request these documents. This then leads
lawyers and their testifying experts to go to great lengths to communicate in a manner that does not create a discoverable record, often at considerable expense and loss of efficiency. For example, substantive discussions about complicated and highly technical issues are limited to oral conversations, and the expert takes no contemporaneous notes. E-mails are similarly confined to purely administrative matters. Drafts of the expert’s report are not prepared. Sometimes, a duplicative “consulting” expert who will not testify has to be hired to provide assistance on issues where, if the testifying expert gets involved, the associated communications would all have to be produced. All this makes the process of retaining experts more costly and less efficient, and puts parties who cannot afford duplicate experts at a disadvantage.

This is all about to change, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recently approved amendments to Rule 26 that significantly alter current practice. (Congress can alter or block the amended rules, but this is not expected).

Under new Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C), most communications between the attorney and a testifying expert, as well as drafts of that expert’s report, will be covered by the work-product privilege and will no longer be subject to broad discovery rights. This will permit the attorney and the expert to communicate more freely about substantive issues, without the fear of those communications being obtained by the opposing party. The new rule has three exceptions, however: 1) the expert’s compensation; 2) the facts or data provided by the attorney and that the expert considered; and 3) the assumptions that the attorney provided and that the expert relied on; must all still be disclosed.

Another change relates to expert witnesses who are not required to provide a written report stating their opinions, because they are not retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony. Such “non-retained” experts are often used in construction disputes because project personnel are often subject matter experts, and therefore are permitted to testify as “hybrid” witnesses who provide factual testimony about events on the project, plus opinion or expert testimony in their specific area of expertise. While these experts do not need to provide a report, the rule changes include a new requirement to disclose the subject matter on which the witness is expected to testify as an expert, and to provide a summary of the facts and opinions that the witness is expected to offer. Draft versions of these disclosures, however, will be protected to the same extent as draft reports by “retained” experts. The revised portions of the Rules of Civil Procedure that will become effective December 1, 2010 can be found at:

http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/ordersofthecourt.aspx

Todd Wagnon
Andrew Ness

Neil MacBride, the U.S. Attorney leading the prosecution team, noted, “Bribery isn’t just a cost of doing business overseas. Today’s sentence makes clear that this is a serious crime that the U.S. government is intent on enforcing.” This statement succinctly illustrate the US DOJ’s commitment to prosecute individuals who violate the FCPA.

Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer has made no secret that the “prosecution of individuals is a cornerstone of [the DOJ’s FCPA] enforcement strategy.” “Put simply,” Breuer said in a November speech, “the prospect of significant prison sentences for individuals should make clear to every corporate executive, every board member, and every sales agent that we will seek to hold you personally accountable for FCPA violations.” Thus, the FCPA poses a hazard not just for corporate reputations and profits but also for the individual executive. Companies can be fined, but only individuals can be put in prison, and DOJ well knows that the prospect of a stretch in the Federal pen can have considerably greater deterrent effect than the possibility of your employer having to pay a fine. Look for more such announcements in the months and years to come, as FCPA enforcement efforts continue to escalate.

Fiona Philip
Andrew Ness