A) The Angra 3 Nuclear Power Project

Nuclear energy provides about 3% of Brazil’s electricity. In 2007, gross production was 445 billion kWh, with net imports of 39 billion kWh being required. Of the total generated in the country, 84% of power was from hydro, 3.5% from gas, 4% from biomass, just over 5% from coal and oil, and 3% (12.4 million kWh) from nuclear. In 2009, nuclear power generated 13 billion kWh of electricity. Per capita electricity consumption in Brazil has grown strongly since 1990 – from under 1500 kWh/yr in 1990 to nearly 2200 kWh/yr in 2007.

The high dependence on hydro gives rise to some climatic vulnerability which is driving policy to diminish dependence on it. Despite this, in February 2010 the government approved $9.3 billion investment in the new 11.2 GWe Belo Monte hydro scheme, which will flood 500 sq km of the Amazon basin and supply about 11% of the country’s electricity. About 40% of Brazil’s electricity is produced by the national Eletrobrás Systema. About 20% of electricity is from state-owned utilities, and the rest is from privately-owned companies.

Angra 1 suffered continuing problems with its steam supply system and was shut down for some time during its first few years. Its lifetime load factor over the first 15 years was only 25%, but since 1999 it has been much better. Civil works on Angra 2 started in 1976 and, due to a lack of financial resources and a lower than expected growth in demand, only commenced operation at the end of 2000. Angra 3 was designed to be a twin of unit 2, with a 1,400MW generating capacity. Work started on the project in 1984 but was suspended in 1986 before full construction began. Around 70% of the equipment is on site, full construction did not begin and work on the project was suspended in 1986.

In November 2006 the government announced plans to complete Angra 3 and also build four further 1000 MWe nuclear plants from 2015 at a single site. Angra 3 construction approval was confirmed by Brazil’s National Energy Policy Council in June 2007 and received Presidential approval in July. Environmental approval was granted in March and all other approvals by July 2009. In December 2008, Eletrobrás Termonuclear S/A (Eletronuclear) signed an industrial cooperation agreement with Areva, confirming that Areva will complete Angra 3 and be considered for supplying further reactors. Areva also signed a services contract for Angra 1. First concrete for Angra 3 was due in 2009. A construction licence was granted by the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) at the end of May 2010, and construction resumed two days later, in June. The plant is expected in operation at the end of 2015 after 66 months.

B) Financial challenges

Economically, power from existing nuclear plants is about 1.5 times more expensive than that from established hydro, and power from Angra 3 is expected to be slightly over twice as expensive as old hydro, about the same as that from coal and cheaper than that from gas. Overall, including Angra 3 in projections reduces network prices slightly. Plans to build two new nuclear plants in the northeast and two more near Angra in the southeast are underway1. At the end of 2009, Eletronuclear commenced initial siting studies at four potential locations in the northeast2, and is aiming to present a list of 40 possible sites to the Mines & Energy Ministry by mid-2011. Eletronuclear is looking at the Westinghouse AP1000 (which is reported to be favoured), the Areva-Mitsubishi Atmea-1 and Atomstroyexport’s VVER-1000.

In December 2010, The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) approved BRL 6.1 billion (US$ 3.6 billion) in financing for Angra 3, covering almost 60% of the BRL 9.9 billion estimated cost. This month Eletronuclear received an offer for a EUR1.5bn (US$2.02bn) loan from a pool of five French banks led by Société Générale to develop its Angra III nuclear power plant in Rio de Janeiro state. This is only one of many recent developments in the country’s nuclear sector. Sustained by strong economic and demographic growth, Brazil’s power demand is indeed expected to increase significantly in the coming years and the country is planning to boost nuclear generation along with its more developed hydro generation. Brazil’s Senate still has to approve the loan, and a decision on the matter is not expected until the second half of 2011. Construction of Angra 3is currently underway and the new nuclear power plant is expected to start production by 2015. The total investment for the project has been estimated at BRL9.9bn (US$5.91bn).

C) About Eletronuclear and BNDES

Eletronuclear was established in 1997 for the purpose of operating and building thermal nuclear power plants in Brazil. A subsidiary of Eletrobrás, Eletronuclear is a government-controlled company that accounts for the generation of approximately 3% of electric power consumed in Brazil. By the interconnected electric power system, such power reaches the main consumer centers in Brazil and corresponds, for example, to more than 50% of electric power consumption in the State of Rio de Janeiro, a proportion to be considerably expanded on completion of the third unit of Admiral Álvaro Alberto Nuclear Power Station (CNAAA). At present, nuclear power plants Angra 1 – with a generating capacity of 657  electric megawatts, and Angra 2 – rated at 1350 electric megawatts are in operation. Angra 3, to practically be a replica of Angra 2, (incorporating the technological advances made since the construction of the latter) is also planned

BNDES is the main financing agent for development in Brazil. Since its foundation, in 1952, the BNDES has played a fundamental role in stimulating the expansion of industry and infrastructure in the country. Over the course of the Bank’s history, its operations have evolved in accordance with the Brazilian socio-economic challenges, and now they include support for exports, technological innovation, sustainable socio-environmental development and the modernization of public administration. The Bank offers several financial support mechanisms to Brazilian companies of all sizes as well as public administration entities, enabling investments in all economic sectors. In any supported undertaking, from the analysis phase up to the monitoring, the BNDES emphasizes three factors it considers strategic: innovation, local development and socio-environmental development. The BNDES’ disbursements reached R$ 168.4 billion in 2010, a 23% increase when compared to the previous year. The result takes into consideration Petrobras’ R$ 24.7 billion capitalization operation. When this operation – a one-off and non-recurring – is not considered, the Bank’s disbursements ended 2010 at R$ 143.7 billion, a 5% increase when compared to 2009, growth which is compatible with previously made projections. Industry accounted for 47% of the Bank’s total disbursements, followed by Infrastructure, with 31% presence, and by Trade and Services, at 16%. In all areas of activity (agriculture, industry, infrastructure, trade and services) disbursements grew in 2010, resulting mostly from the successful Investment Maintenance Program (PSI). Launched in July 2009 and expected to last until next March 31, 2011, PSI guaranteed the return of investment to the country amidst the global financial and economic crisis.

At an estimated cost of S$1.33 billion, the new Sports Hub will boast a 55,000-seater retractable roof stadium, a 6,000-capacity Indoor Aquatic Centre, a 3,000-capacity Multi-Purpose Arena and a Water Sports Centre.

Despite the tender being awarded by the Singapore government in 2008, the PPP project commenced construction only in September 2010 – the result of delays from the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and high construction costs. It is now expected to complete in 2014.

Other major infrastructure projects soon to get underway include the Tuas desalination plant, Singapore’s second and largest such plant. Local water authority PUB closed its open tender late last year and the outcome of the tender is expected in first quarter 2011. The Tuas desalinated water plant is expected to complete by 2013.

This is already PUB’s fourth Design, Build, Own and Operate (DBOO) project. The first three were desalination and recycled water projects. The purpose of such arrangements include helping local water companies build their track records towards eventually exporting such expertise overseas.

Another notable launch is Tuas Power’s Tembusu Complex comprising a waste re-utilisation facility, a biomass-clean coal co-generation plant and a desalination plant, costing an estimated US$1.5 billion.

The project has already garnered several local awards for innovation and research with part of the biomass-clean coal cogeneration plant’s processes converting ash into synthetic aggregates for use in the construction industry.

FIDIC Red Book – A hiccup?

In a rare decision, the Singapore High Court in PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (“PGN”) v CRW Joint Operation (“CRW”) [2010] 4 SLR 672 refused to uphold an ICC arbitration award arising from a contract using the FIDIC Red Book 1999 Edition.

Disputes between the parties over variation orders and payment requests were referred to a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) by the contract. The parties accepted several of the DAB’s decisions, save one involving a disputed sum of over US$17 million.

The DAB decision was referred to arbitration and the Tribunal upheld it in its award. When CRW applied to register the arbitration award in a Singapore court, PGN sought to set it aside.

The Singapore High Court set aside the award on the basis that the arbitration tribunal exceeded its powers in rendering a final award in contravention of the parties’ agreement. The High Court interpreted the dispute resolution provisions in the FIDIC Red Book to mean that CRW was first required to refer the disputed DAB decision back to the DAB for review and confirmation, before involving arbitration.

Notably, the Court observed a possible gap in the 1999 FIDIC Red Book as it did not expressly allow a counter party’s failure to comply with a DAB decision to be referred directly to arbitration.

This is a rare instance of the Singapore High Court setting aside an arbitral award. It highlights the importance of parties understanding the clauses in their contract, especially how the reference to arbitration is to be properly invoked.

Mohan R Pillay
Partner & Joint Head of Office
Pinsent Masons MPillay LLP
Chartered Arbitrator
Adj. Assoc. Prof., Faculty of Law, Nat. Univ. of Singapore
Visiting Professor, Centre of Construction Law, King’s College London
16 Collyer Quay #22-02
Singapore 049318
E: mohan.pillay@pinsentmasons.com

As the ninth largest economy in the world – expected to reach fifth place in the next decade – and the largest of Latin America, Brazil is today one of the best markets for foreign investment and an increasingly important operator in the international geopolitical stage. Despite that, three recent reports have described the quality of Brazil’s transport infrastructure – including the airport system – as ranking among some of the worst in the world, despite growing demand from international manufacturers for goods produced in the country.

a) The first report, by the Brazilian economic consultancy LCA Consultores – which analyzed results from a competitiveness poll conducted among attendees at the 2009/2010 World Economic Forum in Geneva – indicates that compared to another 20 countries with which it competes on a global scale, Brazil hangs on to the 17th slot in infrastructure quality in general. On a 1-7 rating scale, Brazil scored 3.4, below the world average of 4.1.

b) The second report, by Brazil’s Applied Economics Research Institute (IPEA), indicates that a number of airports are on the edge of an operational collapse, meaning there is a considerable threat of a logistics blackout in the airport sector unless investment is initiated immediately. The IPEA report said demand for air travel is expected to triple in the next 20 years, especially with the World Cup and 2016 Olympics putting additional pressure on the country’s transport infrastructure, making the situation all the more pressing.

c) The third report, by consultancy company McKinsey, indicates that investment of BRL25-34bn (US$15-20bn) is needed to meet growing demand in the airport sector over the next 20 years. The study found that Brazil’s 20 main airports need massive investments in upgrades to enable them cater for the growing passenger traffic demand up to 2030. The study further concludes that airports such as the Viracopos international airport in Sao Paolo may need up to BRL4-6bn (US$2-3bn) reals to enhance its capacity to handle passenger traffic in its metropolitan area, the most congested in the country. On the other hand, the state’s Congonhas airport was said to be in dire condition, with capacity levels already exceeded, revealed the study. Only tow Brazilian airports were found to be in better condition, the Galeão airport in Rio de Janeiro, and the Curitiba airport in Paraná state.

With these findings in mind, President Dilma Rouseef wants to make a firm position that the country’s airport system will indeed improve in a fast track model. In her 3rd day in Office the new President has decided to privatize the construction and operation of 2 new airport terminals in the State of São Paulo. President Dilma also decided to open up the capital of INFRAERO (the Brazilian Airport Infrastructure Company) and create an special Secretariat – directly attached to the the Presidency’s Office – to oversight civil aviation business in Brazil.

President’s Office has already started meeting with companies interested in the construction and operation of the 2 new terminals in the State of São Paulo. Those companies have been informed that concession agreements for the new terminals will be of at least 20 years and will have BNDES’ (the Brazilian Development Bank) participation in the financing. The BNDES Credit Lines comprise long-term financing, at competitive interest rates, for the development of investment projects, the commercialization of machinery and equipment, and the growth of Brazilian exports. Credit lines and programs provided by the BNDES serve the investment needs of companies of any size and sector set up in Brazil.

Other investments recently announced shall be placed in the airports at Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Cuiabá, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Manaus, Natal, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, the other 11 host cities of the 2014 World Cup. The Government expectation is that all work shall be completed between June 2013 and April 2014, so that the airports shall be ready to welcome the large number of tourists that should visit the country in this period.

Auction date has been defined

The meeting held between Dilma Roussef, the Brazilian President-elect and members of the State Office and the Government transport sector sealed the date for the auction for the bullet train that will connect Campinas-São Paulo-Rio de Janeiro. According to Dilma’s decision, it will take place on November 29, 2010.

Requests had been made by businessmen to postpone this date, and in view of this, the meeting was held yesterday been the President-elect and the members of the government responsible for the auction.

According to allegations of interested parties, the administration had delayed in disclosing the rules due to the electoral process, which allegedly had impaired companies from taking this decision and from concluding feasibility studies on the project.

Notwithstanding these complaints, the decision was made to maintain the date set on the invitation to bid. Bids will be delivered by the November 29 and the winner will be disclosed 18 days afterwards.

The works, which are now estimated to cost US$ 20 billion awakened the interest of South Korea, China, Japan, Germany, France and Spain.

Funding

The Government published a provisional measure to guarantee funding of up to US$ 12 billion for Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social – BNDES financing for the project.

Provisional Measure 511 included a clause that permits the Federal Government cover up to US$ 3 billion should income for the project fall below what has been forecast for the first 10 years of operation.  This measure seeks to guarantee the interests of foreign investors in the project.

BNDES has held discussions with Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Spanish, German and French investors. The cap for the tariff has been set at US$ 115 for the segment between Rio and São Paulo.  The trip will take one hour and thirty minutes (1:30) and the extension of the bullet train is 511 km.

In May 2008, the Swiss Federal Government commenced a consultation process with a view to the full revision of the Federal Law on Public Procurement. During the process, however, it became clear that a full revision was not advisable due to delays of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement of 15 April 1994 to which the Federal Law has to conform. The Federal Government therefore decided to put the full revision on hold and to focus on certain elements of the Law that required urgent attention.

In May 2010, the Government submitted to the Parliament a proposal for an amendment of the Federal Law on Public Procurement (Message to the Parliament of 19 May 2010, 10.051, http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2010/4051.pdf). The amendment would, in respect of Federal procurement processes for certain types of projects, preclude unsuccessful bidders from seeking a stay of the entire process when challenging a decision of the adjudicatory authority. According to the Government, the current public procurement regulations do not achieve one of their stated main goals, namely the efficient use of public funds.

Pursuant to the legislation in force, challenges of a tender process by unsuccessful bidders, as a rule, do not automatically stay the process. However, courts may grant a stay of the tender process. Bidders bringing a challenge often file a request for such a stay, and these requests are often granted by the courts. This is the opposite of other areas of Swiss public and administrative law, in which challenges, as a rule, automatically have the effect of a stay, and in which the relevant agency or the courts may lift the stay if warranted by the circumstances.

The Government’s experiences in two highly publicized procurement processes in particular are at the origin of its amendment proposal. Both processes came to a grinding halt when certain decisions of the adjudicating authority were challenged:

• The dispute arising out of the procurement for the construction project of the Erstfeld tunnel, which is part of the NEAT project (the world’s longest railway tunnel; see our blog of 6 July 2010), delayed the commencement of the works for 18 months and caused an approximately 50 million Swiss Franc increase of the costs of the project.

• Also in the framework of the NEAT project, the award of the 1.7 billion Swiss Franc contract for the installation of technical railway equipment in the Saint-Gotthard base tunnel was challenged by an unsuccessful bidder. The court in charge of handling the challenge took six months to decide on the request for a stay of the works, which resulted in a de facto stay of the same length. It ultimately rejected the request, but estimates are that every month of stay entailed additional project costs of approximately 10 million francs. Fortunately, the adjudicator and the bidder subsequently reached a settlement.

The Federal Government’s proposed amendment to the Federal Law on Public Procurement would first provide for an automatic stay of a procurement process where a decision of the adjudicatory authority is challenged. Most importantly, however, the amendment provides that if important supra-regional procurement projects are urgent or if their postponement would cause disproportionate delays or damage, a challenge would not prevent the procuring entity from entering into a contract with the successful bidder.

Critics of the proposal consider that it is difficult to reconcile with Switzerland’s treaty obligations and with the fundamental right to court review of adjudicators’ procurement decisions (Peter Galli, Kein Verzicht auf aufschiebende Wirkung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 6 August 2010, p. 10; Marc Steiner, Der Rechtsschutz im öffentlichen Beschaffungswesen – ein Baustellenbericht kurz vor dem Durchbruch am falschen Ort, http://www.sgvw.ch/d/fokus/Seiten/100727_lexleuenberger_steiner.aspx).

“Thus the future American Business will require the highest degree of sensitivity to the political framework in which it functions and to the great coming changes in the World political process.” KISSINGER, Henry A. (1977). Speech before the Future of Business Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Georgetown, Virginia, Washington, D.C.

“First, it is clear that managers consider political instability and/or political risk, typically quite loosely defined, to be an important factor in the foreign investment decision. Second, It is just as clear that rigorous and systematic assessment and evaluation of the political environment is exceptional. Most political analysis is both superficial and subjective and not integrated formally into the decision making process. It would appear that the resulting subjective perceptions of ‘political instability’ are equated on almost a one to one basis with a poor investment climate. The response frequently is avoidance; firms simply do not get involved in countries or even regions, they perceive to be risky. Last, managers appear to rely primarily on internal (to the firm) sources for environmental information. Wlien they look for outside data, they are most likely to go to their banks or the general and business media.” KOBRIN, Stephen Jay (1978). Political risk : a review and reconsideration. Cambridge, Mass. : Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In any cross-border financing, parties (banks specially) take a political risk in the sense that a collapse of the existing political order in the borrower’s country or the imposition of new taxes, exchange transfer restrictions, nationalisation or other laws may jeopardise the prospects of repayment and recovery. In project financing, the political risks are more acute for many reasons, including:

a) the project itself may require governmental concessions, licences or permits to be in place and maintained, particularly where the project is for power generation, transport, infrastructure or the exploitation of the country’s natural resources – oil, gas and minerals; and

b) the project may be crucial to the country’s infrastructure or security and accordingly be more vulnerable to the threat of expropriation or requisition – power projects, airports, seaports, roads, railways, bridges and tunnels are obvious examples.

The term political risk is widely used in relation to Project Finance and can conveniently be defined to mean both the danger of political and financial instability within a given country and the danger that government action (or inaction) will have a negative impact either on the continued existence of the project or on the cash flow generating capacity of a project. Different projects and different project structures will obviously encounter different types of political risk. However, examples of events that might be classified as political risks are set out below:

a) expropriation or nationalisation of project assets (including the shares of a project company);

b) failure of a government department to grant a consent or permit necessary for starting, completing, commissioning and/or operating a project or any part of it;

c) imposition of increased taxes and tariffs in connection with the project, including products generated by the project, or, perhaps, the withdrawal of valuable tax holidays and/or concessions;

d) imposition of exchange controls restricting transfer of funds outside of the host country or availability of foreign exchange;

e) changes in law having the effect of increasing the borrower’s or any other relevant party’s obligations with respect to the project, e.g. imposing new safety, health or environmental standards or other changes in law that result in changes being necessary to the design of any equipment or process;

f) politically motivated strikes; and

g) terrorism.

There is no single way in which a lender can eliminate all project risks in connection with a particular project. One of the most effective ways of managing and reducing political risks, however, is to lend through, or in conjunction with, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other regional development banks such as the African Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

There is a view that, where one or more of these agencies is involved in a project, then the risk of interference from the host government or its agencies is reduced on the basis that the host government is unlikely to want to offend any of these agencies for fear of cutting off a valuable source of credits in the future. This is a persuasive argument and certainly one that has some historical basis. For example, when countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Brazil were defaulting on their external loans in the early 1980′s, they went to some lengths to avoid defaulting on their multilateral debts, whether project-related or not.

Other ways of mitigating against political risks include:

a) private market insurance – although this can be expensive and subject to exclusions. Further, the term that such insurance is available for will rarely be long enough;

b) obtaining assurances from the relevant government departments in the host country, especially as regards the availability of consents and permits;

c) the Central Bank of the host government may be persuaded to guarantee the availability of hard currency for export in connection with the project; and/or

d) as a last resort, but an exercise which should be undertaken in any event, by a thorough review of the legal and regulatory regime in the country where the project is to be located to ensure that all laws and regulations are strictly complied with and all the correct procedures are followed with a view to reducing the scope for challenge at a future date.

In some countries, host governments (or their agencies) may be prepared to provide firm assurances on some of the above matters to foreign investors and their lenders. Obviously such assurances are still subject to a performance risk on the host government concerned, but at a minimum they can make it very difficult, as well as embarrassing, for a government to walk away from an assurance given earlier in connection with a specific project and on the basis of which foreign investors and banks have participated in a project.

As indicated by ASHLEY and BONNER:  ”Political risk identification, measurement, and management are key to successful international construction contracting. Multinational contractors are particularly sensitive to quick, unexpected change in the political environment that affects principal cash-flow elements of their projects. Traditional political risk analysis used by manufacturing or heavy industrial firms for capital investment decisions does not adequately address contracting risks. An alternate approach is presented to fill this important gap. Essential to this treatment is the identification of the primary political source risks and their impacts on project cash-flow elements. Recognition and planning, rather than gambling, is emphasized as a contractor’s best approach to successful international construction.” Let’s learn with them.

Reference:

AHARONI, Yair (1966). The Foreign Investment Decision Process. Boston, Harvard University Press.

ALFARO, L., KALEMLI-OZCAN, S. and VOLOSOVYCH, V. (2008). Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor countries? An empirical investigation, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90, pp. 347–368.

ASHLEY, David B. and BONNER Joseph J. (1989). Discussion of ‘Political Risks in International Construction’, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol. 115, Issue No. 1 (March/April, 1989), pp. 161-161.

FITZPATRICK, Mark (1993). The Definition and Assessment of Political Risk in International Business: A Review of the Literature, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April, 1983), pp. 249-254.

FRYDMAN, R., GRAY, C., HESSEL, M., and RAPACZYNSK, A. (1999). When does privatization work? The impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 4, pp. 1153-1191.

GLEASON, K. C., MCNULTY, J. E., and PENNATHUR, A. K. (2005). Returns to acquirers of privatizing Financial Services Firms : An International Examination, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, pp. 2043-2065.

KOBRIN, Stephen J. (1979). Political risk : A review and reconsideration, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 67-80.

KOBRIN, Stephen J. (1980). Foreign enterprise and forced divestment in the LDCs, International Organization, Vol. 34, pp. 65-88.

LEWIS, M. (1979). Does political instability in developing countries affect foreign investment flow?, Management International Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 59-68.

REEB, D. M., KWOK, C., and BAEK, Y. (1998). Systemic Risk of the Multinational Corporation, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 263-280.

SCHMIDT, D. A. (1986). Analyzing political risks, Business Horizons, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 43-50.

This judgment from the Inner House of the Scottish Court of Session is therefore very useful as an indication of the UK Courts’ current approach to causation of delay and extensions of time. Of course, this may not be the end of the story as City Inn still has the chance to lodge an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Key Elements

The dispute centred on a late-running project to build a hotel in the city of Bristol. Shepherd was employed by City Inn to carry out this project under an amended version of the 1980 edition JCT contract (a UK standard form of building contract with Quantities). The adjudications which followed the late finish resulted in Shepherd being awarded a 9 week extension of time (“EoT“) made up of 4 weeks awarded by the Architect and a further 5 weeks from the Adjudicator. City Inn was unhappy with this result and took the matter to the Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session. They applied for various orders including
a declaration that Shepherd were not entitled to an EoT; a reduction of the Architect’s award of 4 weeks EoT; and an order for payment of outstanding liquidated damages for delay.

Shepherd counterclaimed for a further 2 weeks EoT and for consequent loss and expense. The matter eventually proceeded to trial and was heard by Lord Drummond Young.

The main elements of the case were a bespoke clause covering entitlement to an EoT (clause 13.8), and the cause of the delay, taking into account the multiple delaying factors which occurred and the extent of their impact.

On the first issue, Lord Drummond Young found that clause 13.8 could not logically apply to instructions which caused delay just because they were in themselves late. Lord Drummond Young also noted that City Inn had not referred to their clause 13.8 rights until this juncture, and that neither of the parties appeared to take the clause into account when acting.

On the second – and more interesting – issue, causation and delay, Lord Drummond referred back to another contract clause (clause 25) to give his judgement. He said that under clause 25 the architect was to exercise his judgment and fix a “fair and reasonable” completion date. He held that an apportionment exercise may be necessary where there is concurrency or no dominant event.

The parties had been unable to locate an electronic, logic linked version of the original programme and so had to use a basic programme showing the activities and durations of the project. Lord Drummond rejected City Inn’s expert evidence which tried to establish, retrospectively, a critical path which led to the conclusion that Shepherd was not entitled to any EoT at all. Instead, he favoured Shepherd’s expert who said that he had attempted to establish a critical path, but that it was impossible to do so accurately. Lord Drummond preferred this common sense approach and found that, using this analysis, Shepherd was entitled to 9 weeks EoT.

City Inn appealed unsuccessfully with most of the judgment concurring with Lord Drummond’s reasoning. The majority opinion was set out by Lord Osborne, and contains five principles relating to the evaluation of a delay and loss plus expense claim. Of course, the Court was examining these issues under clause 25 of the JCT form. However, I think these general principles would have relevance to most construction contracts and illustrate the likely approach that would be adopted by the UK Courts:

1. For an EoT claim to succeed the relevant event must be shown to be likely to cause delay or have caused delay.

2. Whether or not a relevant event causes delay is a matter for common sense.

3. It is for the decision maker to decide what evidence to use in forming his conclusion. This may or may not include a critical path analysis. What matters is that the evidence used is sound, whatever form it takes.

4. If there is one dominant cause, all other causes will be disregarded. The dominant cause must be a relevant event for a claim to succeed.

5. It is for the decision-maker to apportion the delay to completion of works in a “fair and reasonable way” where there are two (or more) causes of delay, but only one of which is a relevant event and neither is dominant.

Although Lord Calloway dissented from the ‘apportionment’ reasoning, all three judges concurred in the result and on the critical path analysis being relevant but not necessary to decide the outcome of an EoT claim.

Implications for future cases

I should have of course stressed that this was a Scottish Judgment. What this means is that the decision is binding on the lower courts of Scotland but not so on the English courts – although given that it is an appeal court decision it will at least be persuasive in England.

What is most striking is that all the judges leaned heavily towards the arguments for being guided by principles of fairness, reasonableness and common sense. Many of the arguments put forward centred on the true meaning and consequences of events being concurrent. However, Lord Osborne stated that the important question was not whether events were truly concurrent, but rather the effects on the completion date of the events. In a similar spirit, Lord Carloway talks about the Architect applying “professional judgment” and “using his and not a lawyer’s common sense“.

In terms of implications for future cases in the UK, the judgment must not be considered an approval of the use only of common sense and fairness at the expense of a critical path analysis. In this case the critical path analysis presented was not considered sound and so was not used to form the judgement. However, that is not to say it may never be used to determine EoT claims, but rather it is up to the decision-maker as to whether he uses the critical path analysis in his “fair and reasonable” decision-making process.

And what of its implications further afield – in the international arena? I think the judgment and the arguments employed would be useful to anyone involved in disputes on causation and EoT’s where there are concurrent events and particularly where there is no critical path analysis or such evidence is flawed.

FIDIC talks about the Engineer making a “fair determination” whenever required to determine any matter under the Contract [Sub-Clause 3.5] and the provision dealing with extensions of time [Sub-Clause 8.4] refers to an extension of time “if and to the extent that completion……..is or will be delayed by any of the [specified] causes“. So the same arguments about causation, apportionment and concurrency could run under a FIDIC based contract.

Similarly, the NEC construction form NEC3, which treats delay events as “Compensation Events”, requires the Project Manager (who has to act “as stated in this contract and in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation”) to assess “the length of time that, due to the compensation event, planned Completion is later than planned Completion” [Core Clause 63.3]. Interestingly, in NEC, assessment of the impact of the event includes “risk allowances for cost and time for matters which have a significant chance of occurring and are at the Contractor’s risk under this Contract” [Core Clause 63.6].

And, of course, I cannot sign off without mentioning that Pinsent Masons acted for Shepherd Construction on this case!

With the loss of capability of investment by the public sector, there was a global tendency in 80’s and 90’s to diminish the role of the State, with the privatization and concession of public services to the private sector. In Brazil, The Brazilian Privatization Program – PND, was instituted under the Law No. 8,031, of 04/12/1990, when the concept of privatization became an integral part of the economic reforms initiated by the Federal Government. At that time, all effort was concentrated on the sale of productive state owned companies, tied to strategic sectors, which allowed the inclusion of steel manufacturers, petrochemical and fertilizer companies in the PND.

Between 1990 and 1994, the Federal Government privatized 33 companies, 18 of which were controlled companies and 15 minority shareholder participations of Petroquisa and Petrofertil. Other eight auctions of minority shareholdings were held under Decree No. 1,068. Through these operations the Government obtained receipts of US$ 8.6 billion that, along with the US$ 3.3 billion in debt transferred to the private sector, brought the total to US$ 11.9 billion.

Due to the large amount of funds needed for the viability of infrastructure projects, private companies were incapable of compromising their budgets during the long course of maturation of such projects. The transfer of part of the infrastructure to private initiative, demanding substantial investments in its planning, development and operation, began to be financed by other agents and other sources, due to the integration of the partners in the respective projects.

Commercial banks, multilateral agencies, export credit institutions, pension funds, insurance companies and participants in international capital markets became important financiers of infrastructure projects in Brazil through Project Finance. As a financial model which adapts itself to the need of funds for projects developed by the private sector, Project Finance represents an important instrument to make investments in infrastructure viable in developing countries viable.

The Practical Use and Importance of Project Finance

Project Finance is usually defined as the financing of long-term infrastructure, industrial projects and public services based upon a non-recourse or limited recourse financial structure where project debt and equity used to finance the project are paid back from the cash flow generated by the project. In this context, it represents a financing technique which generally allows a company to raise funds to set up a project based on the feasibility of such a project and its ability to generate revenues at a level sufficient to cover construction and operational costs, as well as debt service and a return for the investor (cf. FINNERTY, John D. Project Financing: Asset-Based Financial Engineering. London: John Wiley and Sons, 2007, p. 4).

Projects like power plants, toll roads or airports share a number of characteristics that make their financing particularly challenging. Large-scale projects might be too big for any single company to finance on its own. On the other hand, widely fragmented equity or debt financing in the capital markets would help to diversify risks among a larger investors’ base, but might make it difficult to control managerial discretion in the allocation of free cash flows, avoiding wasteful expenditures. Project Finance is than used to strike a balance between the need for sharing the risk of sizeable investments among multiple investors and, at the same time, the importance of effectively monitoring managerial actions and ensuring a coordinated effort by all project-related parties.

Project Finance transactions require joint efforts from lenders, investors, suppliers, off takers and sponsors of the project in order to make feasible the implementation of a project, dealing with special challenges, such as:

(1) They require large indivisible investments in a single-purpose asset: Project Finance than deals have contemplated the creation of a special purpose vehicle with bankruptcy remoteness features, as a ring fencing technique, which usually results in credit enhancement for financiers and cost reductions for sponsors, although the creation of a project company is not necessarily a rule inherent to project finance;

(2) Projects usually undergo two main phases (construction and operation) characterised by quite different risks and cash flow patterns: Construction primarily involves technological and environmental risks, whereas operation is exposed to market risk (fluctuations in the prices of inputs or outputs) and political risk, among other factors. Most of the capital expenditures are concentrated in the initial construction phase, with revenues instead starting to accrue only after the project has begun operation; and

(3) The success of large projects depends on the joint effort of several related parties so that coordination failures, conflicts of interest and free-riding of any project participant can have significant costs: From the construction company to the input supplier, from the host government to the off-taker, all parties have substantial discretion in allocating the usually large free cash flows generated by the project operation, which can potentially lead to opportunistic behaviour and inefficient investments.

Trends of Project Finance Structures in Brazil

A. Detailed Financial Structure

In project finance, several long-term contracts such as construction, supply, off-take and concession agreements, along with a variety of joint-ownership structures, are used to align incentives and deter opportunistic behaviour by any party involved in the project. The definition of the advantages and limits of a Project Finance structure requires a detailed analysis of the various aspects must be made by those interested, involving, amongst others:

(1) A study of the structure that comprises Project Finance, detailing the advantages, the disadvantages and limits of each model;

(2) The criteria of evaluation and requirements established by the agents in charge of classification of credit and the respective impact on the composition of the interest rate of the financing;

(3) Identification, allocation and development and implementation of the criteria and methods to manage the risks involved;

(4) Formulation of an accurate economic-finance model to obtain the resources on the international market;

(5) Techniques and implications of the necessary due diligence; and

(6) Monitoring the project during its building and operational phases and respective management of financial documents, also contemplating the securitization of the receivables.

In Project Finance equity is held by a small number of sponsors and debt is usually provided by a syndicate of a limited number of banks. Concentrated debt and equity ownership enhances project monitoring by capital providers and makes it easier to enforce project specific governance rules for the purpose of avoiding conflicts of interest or suboptimal investments. The use of non-recourse debt in project finance further contributes to limiting managerial discretion by tying project revenues to large debt repayments, which reduces the amount of free cash flows. Moreover, non-recourse debt and separate incorporation of the project company make it possible to achieve much higher leverage ratios than sponsors could otherwise sustain on their own balance sheets.

Nonrecourse debt can generally be deconsolidated, and therefore does not increase the sponsors’ on-balance sheet leverage or cost of funding. From the perspective of the sponsors, non-recourse debt can also reduce the potential for risk contamination. In fact, even if the project were to fail, this would not jeopardise the financial integrity of the sponsors’ core businesses. One drawback of non-recourse debt, however, is that it exposes lenders to project-specific risks that are difficult to diversify. In order to cope with the asset specificity of credit risk in project finance, lenders are making increasing use of innovative risk-sharing structures, alternative sources of credit protection and new capital market instruments to broaden the investors’ base.

Hybrid structures between project and corporate finance are being developed, where lenders do not have recourse to the sponsors, but the idiosyncratic risks specific to individual projects are diversified away by financing a portfolio of assets as opposed to single ventures. Public-private partnerships are becoming more and more common as hybrid structures, with private financiers taking on construction and operating risks while host governments cover market risks.

There is also increasing interest in various forms of credit protection. These include explicit or implicit political risk guarantees, credit derivatives and new insurance products against macroeconomic risks such as currency devaluations. Likewise, the use of real options in project finance has been growing across various industries. Examples include: refineries changing the mix of outputs among heating oil, diesel, unleaded gasoline and petrochemicals depending on their individual sale prices; real estate developers focusing on multipurpose buildings that can be easily reconfigured to benefit from changes in real estate prices.

Finally, in order to share the risk of project financing among a larger pool of participants, banks have recently started to securitize project loans, thereby creating a new asset class for institutional investors. Collateralised debt obligations as well as open-ended funds have been launched to attract higher liquidity to project finance.

B. Partnering Construction Contractual Structure

Within time and the more use of Project Finance structures, parties have evolved to the use of Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) – the favourite contract model for the lenders – and Engineering Procurement Construction Management (EPCM). Nevertheless, because the EPC contract approach shifts all the risk of project completion cost and performance onto the contractor’s shoulders, it tends to trigger an adversarial project team relationship, potentially leading to a breeding ground for conflict, contractual disputes and major claims that undermine the project’s financials and its ultimate successful outcome. Therefore, the challenge in Project Finance has been the adoption of the Alliance contracting as a viable, proven alternative to adversarial business-as-usual contracts.

Alliance contracting offers a unique system of project delivery whereby risks are shared between owner and contractor. They are incentive-based relationship contracts in which the parties agree to work together as one integrated team in a relationship that is based on the principles of equity trust, respect, openness, no dispute and no blame. Alliance contracting can relieve the pressure of the short-term demands on the industry and set the foundation for longer term structural improvement in the way the industry works. Also, significantly reduces, the risk of claims and disputation between the parties through the use of inclusive and collaborative legal and commercial arrangements. These arrangements enable the parties to work together in an open and generative manner and to strive to achieve the business goals of everyone in the relationship and can provide a bankable project delivery method even for project financing.

C. Submission to the Equator Principles

Project Finance transactions may encounter social and environmental issues that are both complex and challenging, particularly with respect to projects in the emerging markets. Large industrial and infrastructure projects, such as for power generation, are becoming increasingly conditioned to social and environmental risk assessments in order to be approved. In this context, Brazil is following the international trend to adopt the Equator Principles for Project Finance transactions.

Equator Principles represent a set of socioenvironmental guidelines adopted by 61 banks worldwide for financing projects amounting to US$10 million or more and are intended to serve as a common baseline and framework for the implementation by each lender of its own internal social and environmental policies, procedures and standards related to its project financing activities.

Today, 7 banks are signatories of the Equator Principles in Brazil. They work to ensure that the projects they finance are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management practices. By doing so, negative impact on project-affected eco-systems and communities should be avoided where possible, and if this impact is unavoidable, it should be reduced, mitigated or compensated for, or both, appropriately.

Conclusion

The success in the financing of an infrastructure project, by means of Project Finance, depends on all the parties involved satisfactorily complying with their various contractual obligations under the Project Finance Documentation. Lenders, as well as the other participants, in accordance with the level of risk being assumed and in proportion to the benefits received from the implementation of the project, will undertake the due diligence needed to adequately measure the risks involved.

The viability of the Project Finance model, in short, is based on the consistency and efficiency of its network of agreements. Such documents must be structured and negotiated in a consistent manner with the respective legislation applicable in the jurisdictions involved, and be constructed in such a way as to allow full implementation of their respective terms and conditions, notwithstanding the natural complexity of the same, in a form which will satisfactorily identify, mitigate, allocate and allow the adequate management of the various risks involved in the Project Finance.

On July 13th 2010 Brazilian Federal Government launched bidding documents regarding the concession regime and procedures for implementation and operation of the High-Speed Rail (TAV – Trem de Alta Velocidade) that will connect the cities of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Campinas. The project, the most ambitious infrastructure project under the country’s Program to Accelerate Growth (PAC – Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento), specifies that the construction, operation, and maintenance will be granted to the consortium that provides the lowest fare for service.

The concession contract establishes the limit of six years to complete the entire stretch Campinas – São Paulo Rio de Janeiro. The final schedule calls for the railway to be completed by 2017, although the Brazilian Federal Government anticipates the line will be partially open before the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.

TAV is worth US 20 billion. The Brazilian Federal Government will invest, through a new state-run entity, US$ 1.5 billion in the project and extend loans worth 60% of the total cost by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES – Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social).

Potential customers in the parcels market can be classified into two main groups:

- existing logistics companies, interested in moving consolidated loads, using rail as part of the chain – principal players in this field are the Brazilian National Post Office (Correios – Empresa Brasileira de Correios e Telégrafos) and Courier Companies; and

- end users, such as businesses, or individuals.

The construction of TAV will create a very large site, which will directly require numerous professional skills and directly or indirectly generate employment upline and downline The commissioning of the railway and, in particular, the development of land traffic and associated commercial zones served by the railway will create jobs in a progressive manner during the first 10 years’ of operation.

It is estimated that the railway will generate around 30,000 jobs throughout the area affected within about 10 years after commissioning. In addition a further 30,000 jobs could be generated by around 2050 in response to more fundamental shifts in the regional economy.

The choice of consortia contractor by the end of 2010

The Brazilian Federal Government will pick the contractor for the TAV in December 2010. Competitors must submit their proposals before November 29 and the winner will be announced on December 16 at the headquarters of Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA – Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo). Term of the concession is 40 years.

The line will be built and run on a concession basis and the government will rank bids based on the lowest fare, with a maximum permitted price of US$ 0.28 per kilometre. That would translate into economy class ticket fares up to US$ 115.00 for the 430 kilometres (270 miles) stretch between Rio and Sao Paulo.

International interest

The bidding is open to both Brazilian and foreign firms. News report that several countries and international companies have expressed interest in participating of the project:

- Austria;

- China (China Railway Materials);

- France (Alstom);

- Germany (Siemens);

- Italy (Ansaldobreda);

- Japan (Hitachi, Kawasaki, Mitsui & Co, Mitsubishi and Toshiba);

- Spain;

- South Korea (Hyundai and Samsung); and

- United Kingdom.

A new company called ETAV

Federal Government also proposed the creation of the Company of High Speed Rail (ETAV – Empresa de Transporte Ferroviário de Alta Velocidade), With the objective of planning and promoting the development of other high-speed rail lines in the country.

ETAV will be linked to the National Agency of Terrestrial Transports (ANTT – Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres) and will be also responsible for managing the technology used by the contractor that wins the High Speed Rail bidding process, in addition to monitoring the project’s deadlines.

Speed, locations and planned route

TAV proposal calls for trains to run at speeds of up to 350 kph (217 mph) and the trip between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro is expected to last 93 minutes. Seven mandatory stations are be built on the line:

- City of Rio de Janeiro downtown area;

- Rio de Janeiro International Airport;

- City of Aparecida, State of São Paulo;

- São Paulo/Guarulhos International Airport;

- City of São Paulo downtown area;

- Campinas/Viracopos International Airport; and

- City of Campinas downtown area.

The planned route will include 90.9 km tunnels and 103 km bridges and viaducts. An extension to Campinas, 70 kilometres from Sao Paulo was planned with the purpose of reaching the heartland of Brazil’s richest manufacturing and farming state.

The planned route is as follows:

An acceleration of the drilling and construction of the Gotthard Base Tunnel over the past years has left its planners faced with the unusual prospect of the project being completed a year ahead of schedule. Work on the 57 km long railway tunnel through the Swiss alps, the longest in the world, was scheduled to be completed in 2017. However, following faster than anticipated progress in the excavation and construction of the tunnel, the consortium of companies responsible for the second phase of the works, the installation of the railway infrastructure, will propose the possibility of a 2016 hand-over date.

The Gotthard Base Tunnel is part of the 20 billion Swiss Franc AlpTransit project to build a new rail link through the Alps, with the objective of creating a direct and level route for high speed passenger and freight trains. The new rail link will lead to significantly shorter travel times, for example shaving an hour off the current 3.5 hour trip from Zurich to Milan, and will partially accommodate the projected increase in passenger and freight traffic through the Alps. The project involves the boring of several tunnels, of which the Gotthard Base Tunnel will be the longest and most costly, at just under 10 billion Swiss Francs. The tunnel construction is led by Alptransit Gotthard GA, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Swiss Federal Railways.

Instead of the dual-track tunnel which was initially planned, the Gotthard Base Tunnel consists of two parallel single track tunnels, allowing for faster excavation and shortening construction time by two to three years. Construction time was also shortened by digging several access tunnels, allowing for construction to be conducted on several sections simultaneously. Various consortia were assigned the construction works for different sections of the tunnel, and consist of several major international construction companies. For example, the Consorzio TAT, responsible for the Faido and Bodio sections, includes Hochtief, Implenia and Impregilo, among others. Excavation works are being conducted using four imposing tunnel boring machines, as well as by drilling and blasting. Only a small portion of the tunnel still remains to be excavated, with final break-through in one of the parallel tunnels expected to occur in the autumn of 2010, and break-through in the other expected for the beginning of 2011.

The progress of the boring and construction works has allowed for the second main phase of the project to begin at the end of June 2010: the installation of the railway infrastructure, including the railway tracks, power supply, telecommunication and safety systems. The consortium which was awarded the 1.7 billion Swiss Franc contract for installing the railway infrastructure, Transtec Gotthard, is composed of Swiss energy company Alpiq, British infrastructure company Balfour Betty, French technology company Alcatel-Lucent/Thales and Austrian construction company Alpine Bau. Transtec Gotthard expects to complete the first section of the tunnel by 2013, allowing for test runs at speeds of up to 230 km/h.

AlpTransit Gotthard SA has recognised that it would be technically possible to complete the project a year before schedule, barring any delays to the final break-through of the excavation works, which could for example be caused by cavities or water. It is uncertain however whether AlpTransit Gotthard SA and the ultimate user of the tunnel, the Swiss Federal Railways, will approve the acceleration of the works. In particular, such an acceleration would engender additional costs and would require a greater coordination of the construction works. The political overseers of the project have expressed reservations. Moreover, given that the tunnel is unlikely to be profitable, the advantages of a sooner than planned entry into service are not readily apparent. Indeed, it is uncertain whether revenues from the tunnel will even be sufficient to cover its operating and maintenance costs.